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I.  OVERVIEW 
 
Much has been written about the likely impact of blockchain technology 
during its brief, decade-long existence. Early scholarship on this topic has focused 
on the legal and financial implications of virtual currencies which is based on 
blockchain technology. Rapid introduction and diffusion of technological changes 
throughout society, such as the blockchain, continue to exceed the ability of law 
and regulation to keep pace. Will blockchain prove as disruptive to business 
models and entrenched societal institutions as: electricity, radio, television, or the 
Internet? What beneficial aspects of the blockchain have been identified thus far 
and what future applications are probable? Should we expect blockchain 
technology to result in massive global changes? The primary goal of this article 
about blockchain is to present an all-encompassing basic explanation of what it is; 
how it works; why it’s important; and identified potential uses to date. 
Our article proceeds in six sections. First, we provide a summary 
description of the blockchain. Second is a discussion of the mechanics of this 
disruptive technology. Third, we present an analysis of two distributed ledger 
technologies, bitcoin and the IOTA protocol. Fourth is coverage of the history and 
use of virtual currencies. Fifth, we look at internet scams and the regulators 
charged with protecting against them. Sixth is a brief overview of the many 
identified uses to date for blockchain technology. And last, we conclude. We 
believe this paper is a valuable addition to the literature by providing a readable 
introduction and overview of what is now known about the likely impact of 
blockchain technology. 
 
II.  WHAT IS THE BLOCKCHAIN? 
 
Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi write, “[t]he blockchain is a 
distributed, shared, encrypted-database that serves as an irreversible and 
incorruptible public repository of information. It enables, for the first time, 
unrelated people to reach consensus on the occurrence of a particular transaction 
or event without the need for a controlling authority.”1 In essence, blockchain is 
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simply a data structure that leverages hash functions and encryption to provide the 
security of information like never seen before. Valentina Gatteschi notes the 
progression of blockchain technology: 
 
Three different blockchain evolutions can be identified: Blockchain 1.0, 
2.0, and 3.0. Blockchain. . . . Blockchain 2.0 is about registering, 
confirming, and transferring contracts or properties. Application fields 
range from the use of blockchain as a decentralized copy of local 
databases (especially for public records and attestations) to more 
sophisticated applications. The most relevant feature of Blockchain 2.0 
is the integration with smart contracts 1.0 is strongly related to Bitcoin 
and cryptocurrencies. . . . In Blockchain 3.0, the application field is no 
longer restricted to finance and goods transactions, but embraces sectors 
like government, health, science, education, and more.”2  
 
Gatteschi provides the following major advantages and disadvantages of 
blockchain: 
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Advantages 
 
•  Implements a shared repository that is maintained by peers—everyone 
can access data and view transactions. Moreover, storing information on 
nodes prevents data loss in case of unexpected events. 
•  Provides trust between parties. Digital signature and validation ensure 
that every node and user behaves correctly, without needing 
intermediaries. 
•  Could become a worldwide data repository accessed by different 
actors. Everyone can potentially read/write on it. 
•  Transparency is guaranteed. Everyone could read not only the final 
state of transactions, but also the history of passed states. 
•  Immutability. Data cannot be erased or changed. 
•  Decentralization. It can run without a central authority and cannot be 
controlled, censored, or shut down. 
•  Automation. With smart contracts, activities could be automatized. 
 
Disadvantages 
 
•  Characterized by high power consumption. A Bitcoin transaction could 
cost $6 when considering the energy consumed by network nodes. 
•  Mining requires expensive hardware, and the majority of computing 
power is wasted. Mining blocks is a competition among nodes where 
only the quickest wins—the others are just wasting resources. To 
increase the probability of winning, nodes could join mining pools and 
collaborate with other nodes, sharing revenues. A solution to reduce the 
amount of necessary computing power could be to change the mining 
process from proof of work to proof of stake, where nodes can purchase 
the opportunity to mine using tokens, and mining power is proportional 
to the number of tokens owned. This way, mining would be less resource 
intensive but would be restricted to token holders. 
•  Data replication requires space. Local copies of the blockchain (hence, 
of all transactions that have occurred since its creation—about 105 
Gbytes for Bitcoin and 70 Gbytes for Bitcoin and Ethereum; 
http://bitinfocharts.com) are stored on each network node. Performances 
are therefore not yet comparable with databases. 
•  Adding information is slow. Creating a Bitcoin block takes around 10 
to 60 minutes (http://blockchain.info/charts/avg-confirmation-time). 
Ethereum requires 15 seconds, (http://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime), a 
smaller though still significant amount of time. 
•  Immutability and transparency could harm users’ privacy and 
reputation. Every network node would store a copy of the blockchain and 
could possibly access its content. 
•  Smart contracts cannot rely on external APIs. Every node should be 
able to process previous transactions and end with the same result as the 
other nodes. That is, information must be immutable. Consequently, data 
required by a smart contract should be first injected in the blockchain. 
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Oracles can enable this injection, but require a strong reputation system 
or governance mechanism and need to be as robust as the blockchain 
itself, not to become the weakest part of the process. 
Smart contracts can be buggy. Because their code is publicly available 
and they become autonomous entities once they are created, they could 
be “candy for hackers.” As they are stored on the blockchain, smart 
contracts cannot be modified. To remove code bugs, developers have to 
create new contracts and transfer all data and pointers from the old to the 
new ones. The most relevant case of a smart-contract-based attack 
happened on Ethereum in June 2016, when about $60 million was 
“stolen.3 
 
III.  THE MECHANICS 
 
A.  The Basics 
 
Blockchain is a modification and conglomeration of existing technology 
and concepts. Michael Scott explains, “The blockchain is a testament to the power 
of a single cryptographic primitive–the hash function. Really nothing else is 
required, so if you can get your head around the hash function, you can understand 
the basics of the blockchain.”4 Mr. Scott describes a hash by stating: 
 
A cryptographic hash function takes one input and calculates one output. 
For example, for the input ‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’, the 
well known hash function SHA256 produces the output: 
 
84ba74b2661c87470665a1a5f5ab526afcf266f8c5effb795bef2d2514a8a
fd3 
 
For the slightly different input “we hold these truths to be self-evident” 
(note the lower case w), the output is 
 
246160c031a4ddd9d940e931721fdec7e72087c8eccf5ea5621bb15d229
59c195 
 
The above examples provide information about hash functions. Mr. Scott 
writes: 
 
The output bears no obvious relationship to the input, indeed it looks 
completely random. A tiny change to the input produces a completely 
different output . . . given just the output it’s impossible to determine the 
input. For this reason the hash function is often called a “one way” hash 
function. Also, it’s impossible to find two different inputs which give the 
                                                                                                                                    
3 Id. at 68. 
4 See Michael Scott, The Essence of the Blockchain,1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
5 Id. 
2019] A PRIMER FOR BLOCKCHAIN 5 
 
 
 
©  2018 Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky All rights reserved 
same output. For the function SHA256, the 256 refers to the fact that the 
output is always the same length (actually 256 bits), independent of the 
length of the input.6  
 
Blockchain gets its names from the chaining of the hash. Mr. Scott 
provides us with a diagram appearing here as Exhibit 1.7  
 
Exhibit 1 
A Simple Hash Chain 
 
Mr. Scott writes the following explanation: 
 
Here the T are “transactions” of some sort. Examine this diagram for a 
while, and appreciate the power of the chaining. The value H3 is 
calculated by hashing the whole of block 3, which includes the hash of 
block 2, which in turn includes the hash of block 1 etc. Note that because 
of the one-wayness of the hash function, this chain can only be calculated 
from left-to-right. So already we have some of the properties we want. 
This hash chain can potentially be used as an immutable record of 
transactions. Any attempt to tamper with it can be detected, as the hashes 
will change.8 
 
As Scott observes, “the term block comes a group of transactions. An 
important point–what we have described as individual transactions will probably 
consist in fact of a large batch of transactions all included inside of a single block.9 
 
B.  Consensus Mechanism 
 
The consensus mechanism is the crux of blockchain technology. Professor 
Okan Arabaci provides the following description: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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Consensus is the word for a general agreement or majority of opinion 
between a number of subjects. . . . Consensus in a blockchain network 
refers to the process where the distributed nodes agree on the history and 
the final state of the data on the ledger, usually referred to as distributed 
consensus. Since all participants in the network hold the data, they can 
also be a part of the decision-making. Every new block that gets added 
to the blockchain needs to be agreed upon according to the defined 
protocol so that the replication is done uniformly.10 
 
There are numerous different consensus algorithms that have been 
developed. For example, Professors Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. 
Mohanty, Elias Kougianos, and Gautam Das describe the three major algorithms 
as follows: 
  
1.  Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance Algorithm  
 
The practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) algorithm was 
proposed as a solution to the Byzantine Generals’ Problem, which is 
about conducting a successful attack on a rival city by the Byzantine 
army. For the Byzantine army to win, all of the loyal generals must work 
from the same plan and attack simultaneously. In addition, no matter 
what the traitors do, the loyal generals should stick to the decided plan, 
as a small number of traitors could ruin the plan. Similarly, in the 
blockchain, PBFT works to establish consensus among the participating 
nodes. The nodes maintain their current state, and, when a new message 
is received, the current state and the message are fed together for 
computations to help the node reach a decision. This decision is then 
broadcast to the network. A majority of the decisions determines the 
consensus for the network. Hyperledger, which is working on developing 
consortium blockchain systems for businesses, utilizes PBFT as its 
underlying consensus mechanism. It should be pointed out that many of 
the new developments on blockchain stem from prior work on 
distributed databases. 
 
2.  Proof of Work 
  
Proof of work was the first decentralized consensus protocol 
proposed by Nakamoto to achieve consistency and security in the bitcoin 
network. In bitcoin, currency transfer occurs in a completely 
decentralized fashion, thus requiring a consensus for authentication and 
block validation. The nodes in the bitcoin network compete to calculate 
the hash value of the next block, which is supposed to be less than a 
dynamically varying target value, determined by the consensus rule. 
Nodes achieving the solution wait for confirmation by other nodes before 
                                                                                                                                    
10 See Okan Arabaci, Blockchain Consensus Mechanisms  ̶The Case of Natural Disasters, 17 Uppsala 
Universitet, ISSN: 1650-8319, UPTEC STS 18028 (July 2018). 
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adding the block to the existing blockchain. More than one valid block 
might be generated if multiple nodes find an appropriate solution causing 
a temporary fork (branch) in the network. In such scenarios, all of them 
are acceptable, and the nodes closer to the miners accept the solution 
they receive and forward the same to other peers. Conflict at a later stage 
is avoided by accepting the longest version of the chain available at any 
time. 
 
3.  Proof of Stake 
 
Proof of stake was proposed to overcome the disadvantages of 
excessive power consumption by proof of work in bitcoin. Ethereum 
utilizes proof of stake to achieve consensus. Instead of investing in 
resources that can perform rigorous computations for hash calculations 
in proof of work, proof of stake proposes to buy cryptocurrency and use 
it as stake in the network. The stake is directly proportional to the chance 
of becoming the block validator. To reach consensus, the block validator 
is randomly selected and is not predetermined. The nodes producing 
valid blocks get incentives, but, if their block is not included in the 
existing chain, they also lose some amount of their stake.11  
 
Professors Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias 
Kougianos, and Gautam Das, discuss the following factors to be considered as 
various consensus models are being developed: 
 
•  Type of blockchain: A blockchain network can be permissioned or 
permissionless. 
•  Transaction rate: The consensus algorithm basically decides the rate at 
which transactions are confirmed. In bitcoin, which employs proof of 
work, the transaction rate is only seven transactions/s, because proof of 
work requires significant computation time and the block generation 
time is 10 min. 
•  Scalability: A blockchain system is scalable if it can achieve consensus 
with the number of nodes continuously growing, especially in public 
blockchain systems. 
•  Participation charges: For some systems, an initial cost of participation 
is required. For example, with proof of stake, nodes invest in the 
cryptocurrency to express their interest in the consensus and block 
validation, whereas proof of work requires energy input, which is not 
necessary if you simply want to be part of the network and do not wish 
to mine. 
•  Trust condition: This determines whether the nodes contributing are to 
be trusted and predetermined (as in consortium and private blockchain 
                                                                                                                                    
11 See Deepak Puthal, Nisha Malik, Saraju P. Mohanty, Elias Kougianos & Gautam Das, Everything 
You Wanted to Know About the Blockchain: Its Promise, Components, Processes, and Problems, 6 
(July 2018) (unpublished Manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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systems) or unknown (as in public and proof of work-based 
blockchains).12 
 
C.  Types of Blockchains 
  
Blockchains can either be permissionless (public) or permissioned 
(private).13 Karl Wüst describes the differences: 
 
Permissionless Blockchains 
 
Bitcoin and Ethereum are instances of permissionless 
blockchains, which are open and decentralized. Any peer can join and 
leave the network as reader and writer at any time. Interestingly, there is 
no central entity which manages the membership, or which could ban 
illegitimate readers or writers. This openness implies that the written 
content is readable by any peer. With the use of cryptographic primitives 
however, it is technically feasible to design a permissionless blockchain 
which hides privacy relevant information (e.g. Zerocash). 
 
Permissioned Blockchains 
 
To only authorize a limited set of readers and writers, so called-
permissioned blockchains have been recently proposed. Here, a central 
entity decides and attributes the right to individual peers to participate in 
the write or read operations of the blockchain. To provide encapsulation 
and privacy, reader and writer could also run in separated parallel 
blockchains that are interconnected. The most widely known instance of 
permissioned blockchains are Hyperledger Fabric and R3 Corda.14 
 
D.  Smart Contracts 
 
An integral part to the disruptive influence of blockchain is smart 
contracts. Bhabendu Kumar Mohanta, Soumyashree S. Panda, and Debasish Jena, 
describes smart contracts as: 
 
a computer program having self verifying, self-executing, tamper-
resistant properties. The smart contract concept was proposed by Nick 
Szabo in 1994. It allows executing code without the third parties. A smart 
contract consists of the value, address, functions, and state. It takes 
transaction as an input, executes the corresponding code and triggers the 
output events. Depending upon the function logic implementation states 
are changes. . . . Some characterizes of a smart contract are: 
                                                                                                                                    
12 Id. 
13 See Karl Wüst & Arthur Gervais, Do You Need a Blockchain?, 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on 
Blockchain Technology, 45 IEEE Computer Society, DOI 10.1109/CVCBT.2018.00011. 
14 Id. at 46. 
2019] A PRIMER FOR BLOCKCHAIN 9 
 
 
 
©  2018 Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky All rights reserved 
 
•  Smart contract are machine readable code run on blockchain 
platform 
•  Smart contracts are part of one application program 
•  Smart contracts are event driven program 
•  Smart contracts are autonomous once created no need to 
monitor 
•  Smart contracts are distributed15 
 
These abilities to perform agreements at machine speed and emulate an 
escrow without a need for a trusted third party, provide vast capabilities as seen in 
the use cases in Section VIII (Infra.).  
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF TWO DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES16 
 
A.  IOTA 
 
Named after the ninth letter of the Greek alphabet, the IOTA protocol is 
an open-source distributed ledger technology developed by the IOTA Foundation, 
and designed denovo to power the Machine Economy through data integrity and 
fee-less micro-transactions.17 Bitcoin (BTC) and IOTA are both distributed ledger 
technologies. Bitcoin technology utilizes a vanilla version of blockchain 
technology where transactions are combined together into a block along with the 
hash of the previous block.18 This creates an irreversible and unchangeable chain 
of groups (blocks) of transactions.19 IOTA utilizes a directed acyclic graph (DAG 
or Tangle) instead of this linear chaining20 (both can be seen in Exhibit 2). In IOTA, 
nodes or members comprise a self-rewarding network which verifies transactions 
in a non-linear manner.21 IOTA also has irreversible and unchangeable transactions 
along with Bitcoin’s decentralized system. IOTA, however, does not require 
mining (the computationally heavy requirement for transaction verification) nor 
does it employ transaction fees.22  
 
                                                                                                                                    
15 See Bhabendu Kumar Mohanta, Soumyashree S. Panda & Debasish Jena, An Overview of Smart 
Contract and Use Cases in Blockchain Technology, IEEE – 43488 (2018). 
16 Bitcoin is described in great detain at Section V. (Infra).  
17 See IOTA, What is IOTA?, https://www.iota.org/get-started/what-is-iota.  
18 See Michael Scott, supra note 4 at 3. 
19 See Michael Scott, supra note 4 at 4. 
20 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
21 See Michael J. Casey & Paul Vigna, The Truth Machine: The Blockchain and the Future of 
Everything. An Introduction to Cryptography and Cryptocurrencies 131-32 (St. Martin’s Press, 
2018). 
22 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
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Exhibit 2 
Underlying Data Structure of IOTA and Bitcoin23 
 
 
B.  Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
BTC advantages include its wide spread adoption and testing, direct 
payments with no intermediaries, low fees compared to traditional transaction 
methods, and support for basic smart contracts (Such as 
OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY which makes a transaction not spendable until 
verified). The disadvantages of BTC include that the consensus mechanism relies 
on a majority vote and thus is vulnerable to attack if one entity controls the majority 
of the system. In addition: the wallet (a person’s identity in the system) can be lost; 
there is no built-in mechanism for refunds; and the consensus mechanism is proof 
of work based, creating high waste of electricity and computing power.24 
IOTA advantages include: no transaction fees; more scalable than Bitcoin; 
quantum proof by design; and IOTA requires no mining (transaction verification). 
The disadvantages of IOTA at present include: scalability requiring lots of users; 
and unnecessary and vulnerable hash function; and the lack of smart contracts (still 
underdeveloped).25 
 
                                                                                                                                    
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
23 See Hackermoon (graphic); Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto 
Currency Application Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science 
and Applications (ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors) 
(technical citation behind the graphic). 
24 See George Cornel Dumitrescu, Bitcoin ̶  A Brief Analysis of the Advantages and Disadvantages, 
http://www.globeco.ro/wp-content/uploads/vol/split/vol_5_no_2/geo_2017_vol5_no2_art_008.pdf.  
25 See Michael Colavita & Garrett Tanzer, A Cryptanalysis of IOTA’s Curl Hash Function, 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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C.  Overall Analysis 
  
In a technical sense, Bitcoin is a safer option over IOTA since it relies on 
very basic principles and well-proven/tested algorithms.26 IOTA employs the use 
of a custom hash function, not standard use in the industry, and thus introduces 
additional security risk from a technical perspective.27 Bitcoin, on the other hand, 
employs the industry standard hash function.28 Additionally, Bitcoin’s protocols 
are well tested due to the publicity and the drastic value volatility the coin has 
experienced recently.29 IOTA protocols rely on a more complex concept (of 
directed acyclic graphs) which is less tested than Bitcoin’s; however, IOTA’s 
protocols claim to be quantum computing resistant.30  
In September of 2017, a group of researchers published a paper identifying 
potential vulnerabilities in the underlying hash function to IOTA.31 IOTA has since 
released statements that claiming that the paper disregarded several key factors of 
the IOTA protocol which mitigates the identified vulnerabilities.32 IOTA ended up 
swapping out their custom hash function for an industry standard hash function.33 
The strength of IOTA is still not clear,34 but if IOTA’s claim to be quantum 
computing resistant proves accurate, this additional security strength may prove to 
be a highly valuable attribute. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
26 See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven Goldfed,  
Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction, Ch. 1, An Introduction to 
Cryptography and Cryptocurrencies, Princeton U. Press, 2016). 
27 See Colavita & Tanzer, supra note 24. 
28 See Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven Goldfed,  
Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction, Ch. 1, An Introduction to 
Cryptography and Cryptocurrencies, Princeton U. Press, 2016). 
29 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to 
Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867. 
30 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
31 See Ethan Heilman, Neha Narula, Thaddeus Dryja & Madars Virza, IOTA Vulnerability report: 
Cryptanalysis of the Curl Hash Function Enabling Practical Signature Forgery Attacks on the IOTA 
Cryptocurrency, GITHUB (Sept. 7, 2017), https://github.com/mit-dci/tangled-curl/blob/master/vuln-
iota.md.  
32 See Official IOTA Foundation Response to the Digital Currency Initiative at the MIT Media Lab  ̶
Part 4 / 4, IOTA Foundation, (Jan. 7, 2018), https://blog.iota.org/official-iota-foundation-response-
to-the-digital-currency-initiative-at-the-mit-media-lab-part-4-11fdccc9eb6d.  
33 See Morgan Peck, Cryptographers Urge People to Abandon IOTA After Leaked Emails, IEEE 
Spectrum (Feb. 27, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/cryptographers-
urge-users-and-researchers-to-abandon-iota-after-leaked-emails.  
34 See Heilman, et al., supra note 30. 
12 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
 
 
©  2018 Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky All rights reserved 
D.  Impact of Quantum Computing 
  
A robust body of scholarly literature has been written about quantum 
computing.35 For example, a report sponsored by the US Department of Energy 
provides our working definition, “Quantum computing uses computational 
elements that obey quantum mechanical laws to potentially provide transformative 
changes in computational power for certain problems of interest.”36 One such 
instance of a breakthrough is “Peter Shor’s 1994 breakthrough discovery of a 
polynomial time quantum algorithm for integer factorization [which] sparked great 
                                                                                                                                    
35 See Nicolae Bulz, Alexandru Bogdan, Sorin Chelmu & Amalia Strateanu, Biodiversity 'And' 
Systemic Knowledge Engineering – Theory, Logic and Praxis (I) – An Interdisciplinary Way Toward 
Knowledge Society/Integrated Project for the Exergy and Sustainable Development of the Agro-
Biodiversity Through an Interactive Modeling - Analysis Regarding the Synergy between Rural 
Ecoeconomy and Bioethics Based Upon Smart Growth, Eco-Innovation and Large Scale Systems 
(2011), In RECENT RESEARCH IN ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT, DEVICES, SYSTEMS, 
COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, WSEAS Press, 96 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383685; 
Joanna Caytas, Directionality of Time in Quantum Computing, 10(1) COLUM. SCI. REV. 8 (Fall 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2368826; Marcos López de Prado, Quantum Computing (in 5 minutes or 
Less, Berkeley Lab, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, (presentation Slides) (2015), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2694133; Carlos Pedro dos Santos Gonçalves, Quantum Robotics, Neural 
Networks and the Quantum Force Interpretation (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3244327; David 
Ellerman, Quantum Mechanics Over Sets, (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2344945; Jon Lindsay, 
Why Quantum Computing Will Not Destabilize International Security: The Political Logic of 
Cryptology (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205507; Stefan Heng, Rising Stars in Information and 
Communication Technology, Deutsche Bank Research Economics Working Paper No. 46. (2004), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=620281; Yogesh Malhotra, Advancing Cognitive Analytics Using 
Quantum Computing for Next Generation Encryption (Presentation Slides) (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940467; Michael Marzec, Portfolio Optimization: Applications in 
Quantum Computing (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2278729;  Gili Rosenberg, Poya 
Haghnegahdar, Phil Goddard, Peter P. Carr, Kesheng Wu & Marcos López de Prado, Solving the 
Optimal Trading Trajectory Problem Using a Quantum Annealer, IEEE JOURNAL OF SELECTED 
TOPICS IN SIGNAL PROCESSING, (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2649376; Neeraj Samtani, How 
Would Quantum Computing Impact the Security of Bitcoin by Enhancing Our Ability to Solve the 
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem?, (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232101; P. H. 
Sureshkumar, Ambily Pramitha & Rajesh  Ramachandran, The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 
Based Security Enhanced Cloud Data Center Connectivity, 7(4) INT’L J. LATEST TRENDS IN 
ENGINEERING AND TECH. (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128681; Florenta Teodoridis, Startup 
Commercialization Strategies of Disruptive Technologies: Implications for the Rate of Scientific 
Discovery (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3062776; Andre van Tonder, A Lambda Calculus for 
Quantum Computation, 2003(7) Comp. Sci. Preprint Archive 75 (2003), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2978398; Craig S. Wright, Bitcoin and Quantum Computing (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152419; Vyacheslav I. Yukalov & Didier Sornette, Scheme of Thinking 
Quantum Systems,  6 Laser Physics Letters 833 (2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1470624; Wen-
Ran Zhang & Karl Ernest Peace, Causality Is Logically Definable — Toward an Equilibrium-Based 
Computing Paradigm of Quantum Agents and Quantum Intelligence (QAQI) (Survey and Research), 
4 J. QUANTUM INFO. SCI. 227 (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2541845.  
36 See Alán Aspuru-Guzik, Wim van Dam, Edward Farhi, Frank Gaitan, Travis Humble, Stephen 
Jordan, Andrew Landhal, Peter Love, Robert Lucas, John Preskill, Richard Muller, Krysta Svore, 
Nathan Wiebe, Carl Williams, Ceren Susut, ASCR REPORT ON QUANTUM COMPUTING FOR SCIENCE 
2 (2015). 
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interest in discovering additional quantum algorithms and developing hardware on 
which to run them.”37 
RSA is perhaps the most widely used public key cryptography 
algorithms.38 Professors Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman highlight the importance 
of integer factorization for RSA, observing “the security of RSA relies on the 
apparent difficulty of factoring large numbers.”39 The DOE reports:  
 
quantum computing offers a fundamentally new approach to 
computation that promises capabilities not available with today’s 
existing transistor-based processing. So far, the theory of quantum 
computing has found significant speed-ups to a few prominent 
algorithms in modeling, simulation and mathematics, and experimental 
efforts in quantum computer science have recently made great strides 
demonstrating crude quantum algorithms to solve modest problems in 
physical simulation and applied mathematics. In addition, it is believed 
that the operation of an idealized 100-qubit quantum computer may 
exceed the simulation capabilities of even future exascale computers. 
This suggests that quantum computers may have the potential to enable 
some aspects of computational science to progress far beyond exascale.40 
 
A report by the MITRE corporation, a Federally Funded Research and 
Develop Center (FFRDC) for the US Government, examines the potential impact 
of quantum computing to blockchain technology: 
 
The computational data structure known as a blockchain provides an 
open, public, distributed ledger that has many interesting applications, 
including digital currencies. The security of this ledger depends on the 
difficulty of solving certain cryptographic problems which are 
undermined by the potential of quantum computation. Specifically, 
hashes as used in signing the blocks of the ledger can be compromised, 
as can any public/private key system which relies on the so called hidden 
subgroup problem.41 
 
Brandon Rodenburg and Stephen P. Pappas continue to provide the 
following analysis: 
  
In the context of quantum computing, we are confronted with two 
aspects of invalidating the promises of blockchain. First, the inversion of 
                                                                                                                                    
37 Id. 
38 See Shireen Nisha & Mohammad Farik, RSA Public Key Cryptography Algorithm ̶ A Review, 6(7) 
INT’L J. SCI & TECH. RES. 187 (2017).  
39 See JEFFREY HOFFSTEIN, JILL PIPHER & JOSEPH H. SILVERMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MATHEMATICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 133 (Springer, 2008). 
40 See Aspuru-Guzik, et al., supra note 35 at 6. 
41 See Brandon Rodenburg & Stephen P. Pappas, Blockchain and Quantum Computing, MITRE 
Corporation MTR170487 Mitre Tech. Rpt. v (2017). 
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hashes is assumed to be computationally difficult. If this can be 
dramatically simplified by a quantum computer, the authenticity of the 
upstream blockchain can no longer be guaranteed and the authenticity of 
entries in the blockchain is compromised. . . . As a secondary threat, in 
any aspect of a blockchain implementation that uses public/private key 
cryptography, whether it be in information exchange between parties or 
in digital signatures, a quantum computer may be able to break the 
security of the encryption.42  
 
If IOTA’s claim to be quantum computing resistant proves accurate, then, 
even as quantum computing capabilities are developed, there should be no 
additional security risk.43 This is not the case for Bitcoin’s protocols since they rely 
on industry standard algorithms which are not quantum resistant and thus would 
require quick adaptation and presents a security risk as quantum computing 
capabilities continue to become operational. IOTA’s protocols also allow for 
dramatically more transactions to occur and be verified in a shorter period of 
time.44  
From a business perspective, both technologies offer substantial abilities. 
Bitcoin’s strength is its wide-spread use and adoption. This adoption allows for 
easier integration into existing systems and uses of Bitcoin technology. Bitcoin 
being one of the first distributed ledger technologies allows for easier software 
development and integration into systems. However, IOTA’s feeless and scalable 
design allows for a more realistic replacement of existing systems. A summary 
comparison can be seen in the graphic in Exhibit 4.  
 
E.  Challenges 
 
The biggest problem that distributed ledger technologies face, are 
scalability for adoption into the real world.45 Even cryptosystems like Bitcoin, 
which have risen to public notoriety, lack the scalability to be adopted in a way 
which largely replaces current systems.46 For example, as Bitcoin now exists, it 
cannot be adopted by a country or large bank to replace the existing online banking 
systems because of its limitations as to: (1) the number of transactions which can 
be processed at a time; and (2) the prolonged time it takes to verify a transaction.47 
A number of modifications have been developed to speed up the transaction and 
                                                                                                                                    
42 Id. at 4. 
43 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
44 Id. 
45 Kyle Croman, Christian Decker, Ittay Eyal, Adem Efe Gencer, Ari Juels, Ahmed Kosba, Andrew 
Miller, Prateek Saxena, Elaine Shi, Emin G¨un Sirer, Dawn Song & Roger Wattenhofer, On Scaling 
Decentralized Blockchains (unpublished ms.) (on file with authors). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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verification rate for Bitcoin, but these modifications are not enough for wide spread 
use or adoption.48 An extensive overhaul of the Bitcoin protocols would be 
necessary in order for it to function on a wide-spread system. This lack of 
scalability in the design of Bitcoin creates a challenge for realistic use while 
IOTA’s inherent design for scalability makes IOTA a far more attractive choice.49 
A depiction of scalability of Bitcoin and IOTA can be seen in Exhibit 3.   
 
 
Exhibit 3 
Scalability of Bitcoin & IOTA50 
 
 
IOTA’s biggest challenge is development and adoption.51 IOTA’s strength 
is in its scalability and functions optimally with numerous members. Yet, the full 
use of IOTA’s technology is still being developed before this wide adoption can 
occur.52 A big hurtle being tackled for adoption is the development of smart 
contracts.53 IOTA naively supports smart contracts but the actual overlying 
software which makes use of these abilities is not yet developed as some 
frameworks are for Bitcoin.54 A summary of the transactional difference between 
IOTA and BTC are detailed in Exhibit 4, below. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
48 Id. 
49 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See David Sønstebø, IOTA Year in Review, Year in Preview, IOTA, https://blog.iota.org/year-in-
review-year-in-preview-85686fe1bb3b.  
53 See Nihat Yuva & İsmail Kırbaş, Directed Acyclic Graph Based on Crypto Currency Application 
Example: IOTA, Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Data Science and Applications 
(ICONDATA’18), Yalova, TURKEY on Oct. 4-7, 2018. (on file with authors). 
54 Id. 
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Exhibit 4 
Comparison of IOTA and BTC55 
 
 
F.  When to Use Blockchain 
 
The previously mentioned capabilities, benefits, and costs calls into 
question when blockchain should be used. Concrete examples are described below 
in Section VIII (Infra). Karl Wüst and Arthur Gervais provide the following insight 
into when blockchain may be reasonably applied “In general, using an open or 
permissioned blockchain only makes sense when multiple mutually mistrusting 
entities want to interact and change the state of a system, and are not willing to 
agree on an online trusted third party. . . .”  
If no data needs to be stored, no database is required at all, i.e. a 
blockchain, as a form of database, is of no use. Similarly, if only one writer exists, 
a blockchain does not provide additional guarantees and a regular database is better 
suited, because it provides better performance in terms of throughput and latency. 
If a trusted third party (TTP) is available, there are two options. First, if the TTP is 
always online, write operations can be delegated to it and it can function as verifier 
for state transitions. Second, if the TTP is usually offline, it can function as a 
certificate authority in the setting of a permissioned blockchain, i.e. where all 
writers of the system are known. If the writers all mutually trust each other, i.e. 
they assume that no participant is malicious, a database with shared write access is 
likely the best solution. If they do not trust each other, using a permissioned 
blockchain makes sense. Depending on whether public verifiability is required, 
anyone can be allowed to read the state (public permissioned blockchain) or the 
set of readers may also be restricted (private permissioned blockchain). If the set 
of writers is not fixed and known to the participants, as is the case for many 
                                                                                                                                    
55 Id. 
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cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, a permissionless blockchain is a suitable 
solution. . . . 
In a centralized system, the performance in terms of latency and 
throughput is generally much better than in blockchain systems, as blockchains 
add additional complexity through their consensus mechanism. For example, 
Bitcoin can currently only sustain a throughput of approximately seven 
transactions per second (which could be extended to approximately 66 without 
compromising security), while a centralized system such as Visa can handle peaks 
of more than fifty thousand transactions. There is a tradeoff between 
decentralization, i.e. how well a system scales to a large number of writers without 
mutual trust, and throughput, i.e. how many state updates a system can handle in a 
given amount of time. When making the decision of whether to use a blockchain 
system or not, this tradeoff should be taken into account as well.56 
These tradeoffs between permissionless and permissioned blockchains are 
summarized in Exhibit 5 below:  
 
Exhibit 5 
Comparison of Permissionless and Permissioned Blockchains57 
 
 
 
Professors Karl Wüst and Arthur Gervais provide a decision tree that 
considers above statements seen in Exhibit 6: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                    
56 See Wüst & Gervais, supra note 13 at 46. 
57 Id. at 48. 
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Exhibit 6 
Blockchain Decision Tree58 
 
 
V.  VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
 
Despite the volatility and precipitous decline in the value of virtual 
currencies during 2018, it is the hype and price performance of this asset class and 
particularly Bitcoin that accounts for the rapid global awareness of the blockchain 
since 2009. The Wall Street Journal observes, “After rising nearly 1,400% in 2017, 
bitcoin reversed hard in 2018, falling about 70% and erasing some $160 billion 
worth of value.”59 Financial journalist Paul Vigna asks, “Where does the digital 
currency go now that many speculators have been wiped out? . . . The selloff cost 
the crypto market $700 billion in 2018, dwarfing the $15.7 billion raised by initial 
coin offerings and the $2.6 billion venture-capital firms invested in crypto 
startups.”60 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury, FinCEN division, has defined a 
virtual currency as, “those currencies that operate like a currency in some 
environments, but does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”61 The 
Financial Action Task Force provides a more comprehensive virtual currency 
definition: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
58 Id. at 47. 
59 See Paul Vigna, Crypto Investors Dig Out of Disaster, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2019 at B10. 
60 Id. 
61 Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, 
and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter Trautman, Virtual Currencies] (citing 
Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5–6 (2013) (statement of 
Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury)); 
accord DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
(2013) [hereinafter FIN-2013-G001]. 
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a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions 
as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a 
store of value, but does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered 
to a creditor, is a valid and legal offer of payment) in any jurisdiction.  It 
is not issued or guaranteed by any jurisdiction, and fulfils the above 
functions only by agreement within the community of users of the virtual 
currency.  Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat currency (a.k.a. 
“real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which is the coin 
and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; 
circulates; and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of 
exchange in the issuing country. It is distinct from e-money, which is a 
digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer 
value denominated in fiat currency.62 
 
A.  History 
 
Trautman and Harrell have previously documented the history of barter, 
money, evolution of primitive money, development of a schematic for regulation 
of money in the United States, and modern approach to regulation and payment 
system mechanics.63 We will not repeat that description here. Many observers trace 
the genesis of virtual currencies to David Chaum’s 1982 crypto journal article.64 
Virtual assets and marketplaces found in Massively Multiplayer Online Games 
(MMOGs) such as Second Life where virtual assets were exchanged for actual 
sovereign currencies were also an inspiration for the development of cyber 
currencies.65 
  
B.  Bitcoin 
 
Then, in 2009, the creation of Bitcoin is credited to a pseudonymous 
hacker or group of hackers known as Satoshi Nakamoto.66 For the first few years 
of dramatic growth in virtual currencies, the history of Bitcoin is materially 
synonymous with the widespread awareness of the blockchain.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
62 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT 
RISKS 4 (2014), https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-
definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.  
63 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What 
Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1053 (2017). 
64 See David Chaum, Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments, in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY: 
PROCEEDINGS OF CRYPTO 82, 199 (David Chaum et al. eds., 1982). 
65 See Trautman & Harrell, supra note 63 at 1043. 
66 Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 234 (2016). 
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C.  Cryptocurrency Universe 
 
As of January 3, 2019, Coinmarketcap.com lists 2,083 different 
cryptocurrencies, having a total market capitalization of approximately $130.95 
billion.67 This contrasts with just 656 different cybercurrencies reported by 
Trautman and Harrell as of July 15, 2016, having a market capitalization 
approximating $13.01 billion.68 Ranked by market capitalization at January 3, 
2019, the top ten cybercurrencies are: Bitcoin ($67.26 billion); Ethereum ($15.6 
billion); Ripple ($14.7 billion); Bitcoin Cash ($2.8 billion); EOS ($2.4 billion); 
Stellar ($2.1 billion); Litecoin ($1.9 billion); Bitcoin SV ($1.5 billion); Tron ($1.3 
billion); and Cardano ($1.1 billion).69 By far the largest of these more than two 
thousand cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin’s market capitalization is comparable to 51.3% 
of all virtual currencies combined as of January 3, 2019.70  
 
D.  International Acceptance Differs 
  
The worldwide market for virtual currencies, and Bitcoin in particular, has 
encountered uneven acceptance during the past few years71 w̶ith industrialized 
countries such as Japan72 and Germany73 welcoming Bitcoin. However, regulators 
                                                                                                                                    
67 All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, HTTPS://COINMARKETCAP.COM/COINS/VIEWS/ALL/ (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2019).  See generally Thomas Grove, Farmer Banks on Cryptocurrency, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 23, 2018 at A9 (stating “Cryptocurrencies have sparked new interest in the possibilities of 
working outside the Russian financial system and the volatile ruble, which lost half of its value in 
2014 amid a drop in oil prices”); Wilko Bolt & Maarten R.C. van Oordt, On the Value of Virtual 
Currencies, (Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2016-42, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2767609.  
68 See Trautman & Harrell, supra note 62 at 1053. 
69  All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 66. 
70 Id.  
71 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to 
Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447, 475 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867, citing Matina 
Stevis-Gridneff & Georgi Kantchev, Developing Countries Embrace Bitcoin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 
2018, at B8. 
72 See Paul Vigna & Gregor Stuart Hunter, Bitcoin Wins in Japan, Loses in South Korea, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 30–Oct. 1, 2017, at B9. 
73 See Zeke Turner, Cash-Loving Germany Embraces Bitcoin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2018 at B10. 
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in other jurisdictions, such as South Korea,74 Canada,75 and China76have been 
much open to embracing virtual currencies to date. 
 
E.  Criminal Use 
 
During 2018, James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President at the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), provided Congressional testimony 
that “cybercrime is big business . . . [and] the last few years have shown that the 
Internet has a dark underside that is deeply troubling. The Internet has brought 
tremendous economic benefit, but this comes with the costs created by espionage 
and crime.”77 Mr. Lewis warns, “[t]he development of cryptocurrencies reduced 
risk and increased returns [to cybercriminals], by increasing the anonymity and 
ease of criminal transactions.  The cybercrime monetization process is increasingly 
digitized, with criminals moving stolen funds rapidly among accounts with the 
goal of using it to buy cryptocurrencies in untraceable ways.”78 
 
F.  Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Considerations and FinCEN 
 
The FinCEN is a small bureau of the U.S. Treasury Department, having 
only approximately 340 employees during 2013, and reports directly to the Office 
of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. FinCEN has stated its’ mission as: 
 
to safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money 
laundering and promote national security through the collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of financial intelligence and the strategic use 
of financial authorities.”79 Among FinCEN’s responsibilities is to issue 
regulations and administer the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA).80 The BSA 
requires that a wide range of financial institutions assist FinCEN by 
                                                                                                                                    
74 See Vigna & Hunter, supra note 71; Steven Russolillo & Kwanwoo Jun, Seoul Acts Tough on 
Bitcoin, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2017, at B11; Eun-Young Jeong, Korea Gets Tougher on Digital 
Currencies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2018, at B10. 
75 See Paul Vieira, Bitcoin Alarms Canadian Official, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2017, at B14. 
76 See Chao Deng & Paul Vigna, China Cracks Down on Bitcoin, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2017, at A1; 
Chao Deng, Beijing Draws a Bead on Virtual Currency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2017, at B1; Steven 
Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, Bitcoin Lures Asia Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2017, at B1. 
77 See After the Breach: The Monetization and Illicit Use of Stolen Data: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Terrorism and Illicit Finance of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 2 (2018) 
(statement of James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS)) [hereinafter After the Breach]; accord Trautman, Virtual Currencies, supra note 60, 
at 8. 
78 After the Breach, supra note 76 at 3. 
79 See Trautman, Virtual Currencies, supra note 60 at 31 (citing Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, 
Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs, supra note 11, at 5 (statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. 
Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury)). 
80 Id. 
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having effective anti-money-laundering (AML) programs and by filing 
periodic reports with FinCEN and by maintaining appropriate records.  
Examples of these financial institutions include securities and futures 
broker/dealers, insurance companies, banks, casinos, other money 
services businesses, and certain trades or businesses such as automobile 
dealers.81 
 
A comprehensive discussion of virtual currencies far exceeds the scope of this 
single article. However, many scholarly publications address this topic in great 
detail.82 
For our purposes here, we will simply observe that during 2013, FinCEN 
Director, Jennifer Shasky Calvery states: 
 
FinCEN’s guidance explains that administrators or exchangers of virtual 
currencies have registration requirements and a broad range of AML 
program, recordkeeping, and reporting responsibilities. Those offering 
virtual currencies must comply with these regulatory requirements. . . . 
Those who are intermediaries in the transfer of virtual currencies 
from one person to another person, or to another location, are money 
transmitters that must register with FinCEN as MSB [money service 
business], unless an exception applies. Some virtual currency exchangers 
have already registered with FinCEN as MSBs, though they have not 
necessarily identified themselves as money transmitters.83 
 
                                                                                                                                    
81 Id. (citing Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Remarks at the 
Independent Armored Car Operators Association Cash in Transit Networking Conf. (May 18, 2014)). 
82 See Christian Catalini & Joshua S. Gans, Some Simple Economics of the Blockchain,  Rotman 
School of Management Working Paper No. 2874598; MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5191-16, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2874598; John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?, 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3195066; Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, 2017 Global 
Blockchain Benchmarking Study (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3040224; MARC PILKINGTON, 
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS, eds. F. Xavier Olleros and Majlinda Zhegu. (Edward Elgar, 2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2662660. 
83 See Trautman, Virtual Currencies, supra note 60 at 32 (citing Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, 
Threats, and Promises of Virtual Currencies: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security 
& Governmental Affairs, at 5 (statement of Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Director, Fin. Crimes 
Enforcement Network, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury)).  
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G.  Threat of Cyber Hack 
 
 Just like: individuals;84 corporations;85 non-profits;86 educational;87 state 
and local governmental institutions;88 and institutions engaged in the preservation 
of U.S. national security interests89 ̶ the universe of virtual currencies markets and 
currency exchangers have been subject to cyber breach.90 As discussed more fully 
in our coverage of Initial Coin Offerings and The DAO funding (see Section VI, 
Infra), the SEC reports, “After DAO Tokens were sold, but before The DAO was 
able to commence funding projects, an attacker used a flaw in The DAO’s code to 
steal approximately one-third of The DAO’s assets.”91 
It is important to note that most major breaches of cryptocurrency are not due 
to the underlying blockchain code being exploited, but rather the supporting 
software which is implementing it. These breaches tend to occur at coin exchanges 
or currency managers.92 Journalist Mike Orcutt reports, “hackers have stolen 
nearly $2 billion worth of cryptocurrency since the beginning of 2017, mostly from 
exchanges, and that’s just what has been revealed publicly.”93 Mr. Orcutt 
continues: 
                                                                                                                                    
84 See generally Trautman, Virtual Currencies, supra note 60. 
85 See David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web & Employer Liability (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251479.; Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives 
Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067298; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. 
Ormerod, Corporate Directors' and Officers' Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data 
Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2883607; Lawrence J. Trautman & 
Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 29 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313 (2011),  http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1947283; Lawrence 
J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (Spring 2016),  http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2314119; Lawrence J. Trautman, 
Managing Cyberthreat, 33(2) SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230 (2017),  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534119; Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis 
Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275 (2017),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2623219.  
86 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics, 52 AKRON L. REV. 
(forthcoming),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133818. 
87 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging 
Threat to Corporations, TENN. L. REV. (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3238293.  
88 Id. 
89 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & How It Works, 
5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638448; Lawrence J. Trautman, Is 
Cyberattack The Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 232 (2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2711059; Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 
2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341 (2015),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2548561. 
90 See, e.g., Paul Vigna, Exchanges Pose Cryptocurrency Risk, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2018, at B8.   
91 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The 
DAO, SEC Release No. 81207, at 1 (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-
81207.pdf. 
92 Id. 
93 See Mike Orcutt, Once Hailed as Unhackable, Blockchains Are Now Getting Hacked, MIT TECH. 
REV. (online) (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612974/once-hailed-as-
unhackable-blockchains-are-now-getting-hacked/.  
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Toward the middle of 2018, attackers began springing 51% 
attacks on a series of relatively small, lightly traded coins including Verge, 
Monacoin, and Bitcoin Gold, stealing an estimated $20 million in total. In 
the fall, hackers stole around $100,000 using a series of attacks on a 
currency called Vertcoin. The hit against Ethereum Classic, which needed 
more than $1 million, was the first against a top-20 currency. 
David Vorick, cofounder of the blockchain-based file storage platform 
Sia, predicts that 51% attacks will continue to grow in frequency and 
severity, and that exchanges will take the brunt of the damage caused by 
double-spends.94 
 
H.  Terrorism Use 
 
On March 20, 2018, the U.S. House Terrorism and Illicit Finance 
Subcommittee conducted hearings on the topic “Exploring the Financial Nexus of 
Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime,” observing that Transnational 
Criminal Organizations (TCOs): 
 
have an estimated value of $3.6 to $4.8 trillion, or seven percent of global 
Gross Domestic Product, and result in $130 billion in lost revenue 
annually to the private sector. TCOs should be regarded as a national 
security threat that is undermining U.S. government efforts to combat 
illegal drugs, arms, human trafficking, terrorism, and other crimes to 
include money laundering, cybercrimes, fraud, and corruption. Given the 
profit potential, terrorist and insurgent groups have been steadily 
incorporating criminal activities into their business models, thus blurring 
the line between TCOs and terrorist organizations.95 
 
Cryptocurrency is the preferred currency for not only cyber criminals, as 
seen in the thousands of ransomware attacks,96 but also for criminals operating 
through the internet. TOR, a (mostly) anonymous private network sometimes 
referred to as the dark net, leverages Bitcoin and other major cryptocurrencies to 
provide a level of trusted assurance and anonymity amongst parties who buy, trade, 
and sell everything from drugs to weapons to people. It is important to note that 
not everything described is illicit on the dark net or TOR as it can provide access 
to things that some countries lack, such as free speech,97 or simply can provide 
anonymity and access to more goods. 
                                                                                                                                    
94 Id. 
95 Exploring the Financial Nexus of Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime, Staff 
memorandum of the H. Terrorism and Illicit Fin. Subcomm., Mar. 15, 2018, 115th Cong. (2018). 
96 See Brian Krebs, ‘Petya’ Ransomware Outbreak Goes Global, Krebs on Security (June 17, 2017); 
Brian Krebs, After AlphaBay’s Demise, Customers Flocked to Dark Market Run By Dutch Police, 
Krebs on Security (July 17, 2017). 
97 See Robert W. Gehl, Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web 
Social Network, New Media & Society (2014), DOI: 10:1177/1461444814554900 
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VI.  INTERNET SCAMS ABOUND 
 
Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Etherium, Ripple, et. al., along with 
other new applications of blockchain create a seemingly never-ending challenge 
for law and regulation to keep pace.98 
With rapid advances in technology, global regulatory and law enforcement 
bodies encounter novel and difficult enforcement challenges. In the United States, 
regulators such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) division of The Department of the Treasury must 
respond to these new demands. 
Do we want to discuss other country’s attempts to regulate? Such as china 
who has banned cryptocurrency and is looking to issue their own state currency or 
(south) Korea who initially banned it but repealed the ban due to enforcement 
issues and civil push back. 
 
A.  Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
Cyber-securities fraud remains an unanticipated challenge to the 
regulation of global and U.S. securities markets, certainly “unimagined over eighty 
years ago by drafters of the Securities and Exchange Acts.”99 During 2018, SEC 
Commissioner Hester M. Peirce states, “[i]nnovation is always a challenge for 
regulators. We are used to the way things have been done. Our rules have grown 
up in response to past technologies. Figuring out whether and how they apply to 
new ideas is difficult.”100 In a statement dated December 11, 2017, SEC Chairman 
Jay Clayton observes: 
 
                                                                                                                                    
98 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and Regulation to 
Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3182867. See also Walter 
Keith Robinson & Joshua T.  Smith, Emerging Technologies Challenging Current Legal Paradigms, 
19(2) MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH., (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3220440.  
99 See Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web 
of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014), citing Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter 1933 
Act] § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter 1934 Act] § 
3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1951148. 
100 Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Beaches and Bitcoin: Remarks Before 
the Medici Conf., Los Angeles, Cal. (May 2, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-
peirce-050218; accord Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 360 
(2016); Shawn Bayern, Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of 
Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 22, 23 (2014); Jerry Brito, Houman Shadab & Andrea 
Castillo, Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and Gambling, 
16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 146 (2014); Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the 
Innovation Trilemma, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054770; Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The 
ABCs of Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1495 (2016); Omri Marian, A 
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The world’s social media platforms and financial markets are 
abuzz about cryptocurrencies and “initial coin offerings” (ICOs). 
. . . . 
A number of concerns have been raised regarding the 
cryptocurrency and ICO markets, including that, as they are currently 
operating, there is substantially less investor protection than in our 
traditional securities markets, with correspondingly greater opportunities 
for fraud and manipulation. 
. . . [T]o date no initial coin offerings have been registered with 
the SEC. The SEC also has not to date approved for listing and trading 
any exchange-traded products (such as EFTs) holding cryptocurrencies 
or other assets related to cryptocurrencies.101 
 
Representative of recent SEC enforcement actions regarding virtual 
currencies or initial coin offerings is the settlement announced on December 12, 
2018, wherein: 
 
Two former executives behind an allegedly fraudulent initial 
coin offering (ICO) that was stopped by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission earlier this year have been ordered in federal court to pay 
nearly $2.7 million and prohibited from serving as officers or directors 
of public companies or participating in future offerings of digital 
securities. 
AriseBank’s then-CEO Jared Rice Sr. and then-COO Stanley 
Ford were accused of offering and selling unregistered investments in 
their purported “AriseCoin” cryptocurrency by depicting AriseBank as a 
first-of-its-kind decentralized bank offering a variety of services to retail 
investors. 
“Rice and Ford lied to AriseBank’s investors by pitching the 
company as a first-of-its kind decentralized bank offering its own 
cryptocurrency for customer products and services,” said Shamoil T. 
Shipchandler, Director of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office. “The 
officer-and-director bar and digital securities offering bar will prevent 
Rice and Ford from engaging in another cryptoasset-based fraud.” 
                                                                                                                                    
Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE  53, 57 
(2015); Hossein Nabilou & André Prüm, Ignorance, Debt and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the 
New in the Law and Economics of Concurrent Currencies, J. FIN. REG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3121918; Seth C. Oranburg, Hyperfunding: Regulating Financial 
Innovations, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2018); Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an 
Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. 
L. REV. 191, 193 (2016); Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 399 
(2017); Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript 
at 50), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127782; Scott Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: 
Leveraging the Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE 
J. L. & TECH. 335, 366 (2017). 
101 See Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. EXCH. 
COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-
11. 
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To settle the SEC’s charges, Rice and Ford agreed to be held 
jointly and severally liable for $2,259,543 in disgorgement plus $68,423 
in prejudgment interest, and each must pay a $184,767 penalty. They 
also agreed to lifetime bars from serving as officers and directors of 
public companies and participating in digital securities offerings, and 
permanent prohibitions against violating the antifraud and registration 
provisions of the federal securities laws. . . .102 
 
In terms of SEC focus on distributed ledger technology, digital assets and Initial 
Coin Offerings, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton states that an: 
 
area where the Commission and staff have spent a significant amount of 
time relates to distributed ledger technology, digital assets and initial 
coin offerings (ICOs). I expect that trend will continue in 2019. A 
number of concerns have been raised regarding the digital assets and ICO 
markets, including that, as they are currently operating, there is 
substantially less investor protection than in the traditional equities and 
fixed income markets, with correspondingly greater opportunities for 
fraud and manipulation. 
I believe that ICOs can be effective ways for entrepreneurs and 
others to raise capital. However, the novel technological nature of an 
ICO does not change the fundamental point that, when a security is being 
offered, our securities laws must be followed. 
In an effort to centralize and better coordinate the staff’s work 
on these important issues, the SEC recently announced the formation of 
a new Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology 
(“FinHub”) within the agency. Staffed by representatives from across the 
Commission, the FinHub serves as a public resource for fintech-related 
issues at the SEC. As the FinHub and our other activities demonstrate, 
our door remains open to those who seek to innovate and raise capital in 
accordance with the law.103 
 
B.  Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
 
The CFTC claims regulatory authority over digital assets (virtual 
currencies) under a theory that the CFTC’s authority over futures and other 
derivatives extends to virtual currencies as commodities as defined in Section 1a(9) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act.104 Based on the important characteristics of 
digital assets such as bitcoin, these assets, like commodities, “are units of 
                                                                                                                                    
102 Press Release, SEC, Executives Settle ICO Scam Charges (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-280.  
103 Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Rulemaking Over the 
Past Year, the Road Ahead and Challenges Posed by Brexit, LIBOR Transition and Cybersecurity 
Risks (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-120618.  
104 See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2012); see also Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-29 (Sept. 17, 2015); BFXNA 
Inc., CFTC No. 16-19 (June 2, 2016). 
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commerce that are interchangeable, traded in markets where customers are not 
readily identifiable, and are immediately marketable at quoted prices.  Further, like 
gold bullion and other commodities, bitcoin come into supply only when they are 
mined or extracted and are a limited resource.”105 
In a joint statement about virtual currency enforcement actions by SEC 
and CFTC Enforcement Directors, Stephanie Avakian and Steven Peikin of the 
SEC and CFTC Enforcement Director James McDonald warn: 
 
When market participants engage in fraud under the guise of offering 
digital instruments–whether characterized as virtual currencies, coins, 
tokens, or the like–the SEC and the CFTC will look beyond form, 
examine the substance of the activity and prosecute violations of the 
federal securities and commodities laws. The Divisions of Enforcement 
for the SEC and CFTC will continue to address violations and bring 
actions to stop and prevent fraud in the offer and sale of digital 
instruments.106 
 
VII.  USES FOR BLOCKCHAIN 
 
A comprehensive discussion of the numerous potential identified use cases 
for blockchain technologies to date far exceeds the scope of this article. While not 
exhaustive, we have identified the following promising potential blockchain 
applications: accounting and auditing; agriculture; anti-money laundering; 
artificial intelligence; bills of lading; business supply chains; carbon markets; 
commercial real estate; commodity platform; copyrights; corporate governance; 
creative and artistic industries; deceptive counterfeit prevention; economic 
planning; education; elections; entrepreneurship and innovation; fiat money; 
financial services and capital markets; fractional ownership; governance; 
healthcare; insurance; internet of things (IoT); knowledge management; law 
enforcement; legal practice; marketing; privacy; promotion of world peace; 
property law; renewable energies; satellite navigation; securities clearing and 
settlement; smart cities; smart contracts; state and municipal operating 
efficiencies; and tax calculation and compliance. Space limitation precludes our 
coverage of little more than brief mention of these topics. However, a hopefully 
useful overview follows.  
 
                                                                                                                                    
105 See Winklevoss Bitcoin Tr., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1 (Form S-1), at 4, F8 (Feb. 8, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1579346/000119312517034708/d296375ds1a.htm.  
106 Press Release, Joint Statement by SEC and CFTC Enforcement Directors Regarding Virtual 
Currency Enforcement Actions: SEC Co-Enforcement Directors Stephanie Avakian and Steven 
Peikin and CFTC Enforcement Director James McDonald (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-statement-sec-and-cftc-enforcement-directors.  
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A.  Accounting and Auditing 
  
Suggested or documented applications for blockchain in the profession 
and practice of accounting and auditing are numerous.107 
 
B.  Agriculture 
 
Law firm Michael, Best & Friedrich report, “a recent surge in large food 
and retail firms looking to invest in the [blockchain] technology as a means to 
increase supply chain transparency in the food system.”108 Examples of significant 
industry participants include, “IBM partner[ing] with Nestle, Unilever, Tyson 
Foods, Walmart, and other food companies to use blockchain to increase 
traceability and tracking of certain products.”109 The largest U.S. retailer and 
employer, “Walmart is now requiring direct suppliers of lettuce, spinach, and other 
greens as well as farmers, logistics firms, and other supply partners to join the big-
box store’s food-tracking blocking starting in 2019.”110 Other applications of 
blockchain to food and agriculture are noted.111 
 
C.  Anti-money Laundering 
 
The use of virtual currencies by transnational crime syndicates and other 
corrupt actors has presented global law enforcement agencies with new and 
                                                                                                                                    
107 See Volodymyr Babich & Gilles Hilary, Blockchain and Other Distributed Ledger Technologies 
in Operations, (unpublished ms.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232977; Sean S. Cao, Lin William 
Cong & Baozhong Yang, Auditing and Blockchains: Pricing, Misstatements, and Regulation, 
(unpublished ms.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248002; Maria Karajovic, Henry Kim & Marek 
Laskowski, Thinking Outside the Block: Projected Phases of Blockchain Integration in the 
Accounting Industry (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984126; Chandra Shekar Mylaavaram, R. 
Kumaran &  R. K. Mishra, Blockchain Technology - An Exploratory Study on Its Applications, THE 
MGMT. ACCT. (June 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194522; Daniel E. O'Leary, Configuring 
Blockchain Architectures for Transaction Information in Blockchain Consortiums: The Case of 
Accounting and Supply Chain Systems (unpublished ms.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102671; 
Reinhard Schrank, Audit Quality, Legal Liability, and the Audit Market Under Risk Aversion 
(unpublished ms.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3258555; Ting Yu, Zhiwei Lin & Qingliang Tang, 
Blockchain: Introduction and Application in Financial Accounting (unpublished 
ms.), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3258504.  
108 See Emily R. Lyons, David A. Crass, Cheryl I. Aaron & Sarah C. Helton, What Blockchain Means 
for the Agriculture and Food Industries, Michael Best & Friedrich LLP (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://www.michaelbest.com/Newsroom/192905/What-Blockchain-Means-for-the-Agriculture-
and-Food-Industries.  
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 See Henry Kim & Marek Laskowski, Agriculture on the Blockchain: Sustainable Solutions for 
Food, Farmers, and Financing (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028164.   
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difficult challenges.112 A new literature about virtual currency threats and 
blockchain applications related to anti-money laundering efforts is emerging.113 
 
D.  Artificial Intelligence 
 
Examples of potential uses for blockchain technology with artificial intelligence 
(AI) are now appearing in the literature.114 
 
  E.  Bills of Lading 
 
According to Elson Ong, “A bill of lading operates as a document of title 
if it enables the consignee to take delivery of the goods at their destination or to 
dispose of them by the endorsement and delivery of the bill of lading.”115 Other 
scholars have discussed the application of blockchain technology to bills of 
lading.116 
 
F.  Business Supply Chains 
 
Business supply chains appear to be an area having unusually robust 
promise for successful blockchain application.117 
 
                                                                                                                                    
112 See Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Talis J. Putnins, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much 
Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, REV. FIN. STUD. (Forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3102645. 
113 See Ross Anderson, Ilia Shumailov, Mansoor Ahmed & Alessandro Rietmann, Bitcoin Redux, at 
6.5 (2018); Ehi Esoimeme, A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Money Laundering Measures Adopted by 
BitGold Inc. (2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2604721; Ehi Esoimeme, Balancing Anti-Money 
Laundering Measures and Financial Inclusion: The Example of the United Kingdom and Nigeria, J. 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL, (Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172081. 
114 See Bo Xing, & Tshilidzi Marwala, The Synergy of Blockchain and Artificial Intelligence (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225357. See also William Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence 
(unpublished ms.) (2019). 
115 See Elson Ong, Call a Bill a Bill: The Star Quest, 23 J. INT’L MARITIME L. 328, 334 (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123753. 
116 See Elson Ong, Blockchain Bills of Lading. NUS Law Working Paper No. 2018/020 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225520.   
117 See Volodymyr Babich & Gilles Hilary, Distributed Ledgers and Operations: What Operations 
Management Researchers Should Know About Blockchain Technology (2018). Forthcoming in 
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; Georgetown McDonough School of Business 
Research Paper No. 3131250. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131250; Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson & 
Jason Potts, Outsourcing Vertical Integration: Distributed Ledgers and the V-Form Organisation 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300506; Bhavya Bhandari, Supply Chain Management, 
Blockchains and Smart Contracts (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3204297; Jiri Chod, Nikolaos 
Trichakis, Gerry Tsoukalas, Henry Aspegren & Mark Weber, Blockchain and the Value of 
Operational Transparency for Supply Chain Finance 2018). Mack Institute for Innovation 
Management, Working Paper Series, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078945 (providing signals 
enhancing finance); Henry Kim & Marek Laskowski, Towards an Ontology-Driven Blockchain 
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G.  Carbon Markets 
 
Several scholars have written about the application of blockchain 
technology to carbon markets.118 See also our separate discussion regarding 
renewable energy (Infra.). 
 
H.  Commercial Real Estate 
 
A literature review reveals a modest trail of scholarship to date illustrating 
blockchain applications to commercial real estate.119 See also coverage of property 
law and real estate (Infra). 
 
I.  Commodity Platforms 
 
Commodity trade finance platform proposals using distributed ledger 
technology has been noted.120 
 
J.  Copyrights 
 
A number of scholars have written about the application of blockchain 
technology to copyright.121 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Design for Supply Chain Provenance (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2828369; Adam J. 
Sulkowski, Blockchain, Law, and Business Supply Chains: The Need for Governance and Legal 
Frameworks to Achieve Sustainability (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205452.   
118 See Adrian Jackson, Ashley Lloyd, Justin Macinante & Markus Hüwener, Networked Carbon 
Markets: Permissionless Innovation with Distributed Ledgers?, (2018). Edinburgh Sch. L. Res. Paper 
No. 2018/07, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138478; Robert Leonhard, Developing the Crypto Carbon 
Credit on Ethereum's Blockchain (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3000472; Robert Leonhard, 
Forget Paris: Building a Carbon Market in the U.S. Using Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082450; Justin Macinante, A Conceptual Model for Networking of 
Carbon Markets on Distributed Ledger Technology Architecture. Edinburgh Sch. L. Res. Paper No. 
09/2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948580.   
119 See Hitesh Malviya, Blockchain for Commercial Real Estate (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922695; Sergio Nasarre-Aznar, Collaborative Housing and Blockchain, 
66(2) ADMINISTRATION 59 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3189050. 
120 See Jianfu Wang, Commodity Trade Finance Platform Using Distributed Ledger Technology: 
Token Economics in a Closed Ecosystem Using Agent-Based Modeling (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3152093. 
121 See Annabel Tresise, Jake Goldenfein & Dan Hunter, What Blockchain Can and Can't Do for 
Copyright, 28 AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. J. 144 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3227381; Jake 
Goldenfein & Dan Hunter, Blockchains, Orphan Works, and the Public Domain, 41 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3083153; Nick Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How Web 
3.0 Will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 136 (2015). 
32 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
 
 
©  2018 Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky All rights reserved 
K.  Corporate Governance 
 
Directors are responsible for the governance of a corporation.122 Numerous 
scholars have found blockchain applications to be applicable to the governance of 
corporations.123 
 
L.  Creative and Artistic Industries 
 
Outside the specific category of copyright, a number of scholars have 
written about the potential value of blockchain to a broad category of endeavors 
we are describing as the creative and artistic industries.124 
 
M.  Deceptive Counterfeit Prevention 
 
The potential for deployment of blockchain technology in the prevention 
of deceptive counterfeit goods is noted.125 
 
                                                                                                                                    
122 See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging 
Threat to Corporations, TENN. L. REV. (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3238293.  
123 See Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate 
Managers Lifetime Tenure?, Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 18-04; European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 384/2018. (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107225; Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and 
Corporate Governance: Blockchain, Crypto, and Artificial Intelligence (2018). Lex Research Topics 
in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2018-7; Eur. Corp. Governance Institute (ECGI) 
- Law Working Paper No. 424/2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3263222; Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. 
McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of 'Corporate' Governance: Hello 'Platform' 
Governance, Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2018-5; 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 430/2018, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3232663; Robert Leonhard, Corporate Governance on Ethereum's 
Blockchain (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977522; Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, 
Blockchain and Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community. European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 412/2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3219146; Christoph 
Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Bringing the AGM to the 21st Century: Blockchain and Smart 
Contracting Tech for Shareholder Involvement (June 2017). European Corporate Governance 
Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 358/2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992804.   
124 See Jason Potts & Ellie Rennie, Blockchains and Creative Industries (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3072129; Stan Sater, Tokenize the Musician, 21 Tulane J. Tech. & Intell. 
Prop. (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160798 (music recording and performance economics); 
Kelly Snook & Jason Potts, Concordia – A New Future Economy of Music. For International Cultural 
Economics Conference, 27-29 June, RMIT University, Melbourne Australia, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3174172; Bo Xing, Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: A Digital Art 
Perspective (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225323 (digital art).  
125 See Hubert Pun, Jayashankar M. Swaminathan & Pengwen Hou, Blockchain Adoption for 
Combating Deceptive Counterfeits (2018). Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 
18-18., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223656.    
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N.  Economic Planning 
 
Several scholars have posited the scenario of an entire planned economic 
system through blockchain networks.126 
  
O.  Education 
 
A number of scholars have explored the use of blockchain technology in 
education, concluding that these applications are presently only in an infancy state, 
and offering suggestions for additional research.127 
 
P.  Elections 
 
A few scholars have written about the application of blockchain 
technology to elections.128 
 
Q.  Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Professors Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson, and Jason Potts contend “that 
the institutional innovation of blockchain engenders a new post-industrial 
economic era that requires new policy rules.”129 This paper seeks to explain why 
this change will occur, and to explore a new framework for economic policy 
adapted to economic infrastructure built on distributed ledgers. 
 
R.  Extractive Industries 
 
The benefits of blockchain technology to the extractive industries has been 
demonstrated by several scholars.130 
 
                                                                                                                                    
126 See Kartik Hegadekatti & Yatish S. G., The Programmable Economy: Envisaging an Entire 
Planned Economic System as a Single Computer Through Blockchain Networks, (2017),  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943227.    
127 See Wiebke Lévy, Jutta Stumpf-Wollersheim & Isabell M., Welpe, Disrupting Education Through 
Blockchain-Based Education Technology?, (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210487.  
128 See Usman W. Chohan, Blockchain Enhancing Political Accountability? Sierra Leone 2018 Case 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3147006; Kartik Hegadekatti, Analysis of Present Day Election 
Processes vis-à-vis Elections Through Blockchain Technology (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2904868; Samuel Martin, Blockchain as a Solution to the United States’ 
Voter Turnout Issue (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177523. 
129 See Chris Berg, Sinclair Davidson & Jason Potts, Capitalism After Satoshi: Blockchains, 
Dehierarchicalisation, Innovation Policy, and the Regulatory State, J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & PUB. 
POL’Y (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299776; Jon M. Truby, FinTech and the City: Sandbox 2.0 
Policy and Regulatory Reform Proposals, INT’L REV. L. COMP. & 
TECH.,  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299300. 
130 See Usman W. Chohan, Blockchain and the Extractive Industries: Cobalt Case Study (2018), 
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S.  Fiat Money 
 
A number of authors explore the history and definition of money and 
whether crypto currencies may replace fiat currencies.131 
 
T.  Financial Services and Capital Markets 
 
Much has been written about the application of blockchain technology to 
financial services and capital markets. Unfortunately, space limits our footnote 
coverage to just a small portion of the body literature.132 
                                                                                                                                    
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138271; Usman W. Chohan, Blockchain and the Extractive Industries #2: 
Diamonds Case Study (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141883; Ushnish Sengupta, & Henry Kim, 
How Indigenous Entrepreneurs Can Use Trustless Technology to Rebuild Trust: A Case for Business 
Process Transformation in Natural Resources Development Using Blockchain (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246385. 
131 See Richard Senner & Didier Sornette, The Holy Grail of Crypto Currencies: Ready to Replace 
Fiat Money?, (Forthcoming) J. ECON. ISSUES, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192924. 
132 See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial 
Services?, CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 234 (2016). See also Jun Aoyagi, Daisuke Adachi, 
Economic Implications of Blockchain Platforms (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3132235; 
Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement 
in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEVADA L.J. 1 (2016), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2851492; David Lee Kuo Chuen, Decentralization and Distributed 
Innovation: Fintech, Bitcoin and ICO's (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3107659; Ryan Clements, 
Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of a Smart Contract Blockchain Framework for Credit Default 
Swaps, 10 WILLIAM & MARY BUS. L. REV. 3 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197706; Shaen 
Corbet, Charles James Larkin, Brian M. Lucey, Andrew Meegan Larisa Yarovaya, Cryptocurrency 
Reaction to FOMC Announcements: Evidence of Heterogeneity Based on Blockchain Stack Position 
(2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073727; Benjamin Geva, Banking in the Digital Age - Who is 
Afraid of Payment Disintermediation? (2018). European Banking Institute Working Paper Series 
2018 - no. 23., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3153760; Giuseppe Giudici, Legal Problems of the 
Blockchain: A Capital Markets Perspective (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3240273; Peter 
Gomber, Robert J.  Kauffman, Chris Parker & Bruce Weber, On the Fintech Revolution: Interpreting 
the Forces of Innovation, Disruption and Transformation in Financial Services, 35(1) J. MGMT. INFO. 
SYS. 220 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3190052; Adam Hayes, Decentralized Banking: 
Monetary Technocracy in the Digital Age, Tenth Mediterranean Conference on Information Systems 
(MCIS), Paphos, Cyprus, September 2016, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807476; Gur Huberman, 
Jacob Leshno & Ciamac C. Moallemi, An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System (2018). 
Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-92., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3025604; Sarah 
Jane Hughes, Permission-less Blockchain-Based Payment and Property Transactions Challenge 
Global Anti-Money-Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Finance Laws Enforcement Regimes 
(unpublished ms.) (on file with authors); Anil Savio Kavuri & Alistair K. L. Milne, Fintech and the 
Future of Financial Services: What are the Research Gaps? (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215849; Christoffer Koch & Gina C. Pieters, Blockchain Technology 
Disrupting Traditional Records Systems (July 5, 2017). Financial Insights - Dallas Federal Reserve 
Bank, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2997588; Joseph Lee, Distributed Ledger Technologies 
(Blockchain) in Capital Markets: Risk and Governance (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3180553; 
William J. Magnuson, Regulating Fintech,  71(4) VAND. L. REV. 1167 (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3027525; William J. Magnuson, Financial Regulation in the Bitcoin Era, 
23(2) STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 159 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3148036; Daniel E. O'Leary, 
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U.  Fractional Ownership 
 
Literature has recently appeared illustrating the application of blockchain 
technology to facilitate fractional ownership.133 See also our discussion regarding 
the creative industries (Infra). 
 
V.  Governance 
 
Many applications fall into this category. One of the idealized uses of 
blockchain is to track, with irrefutable certainty, events such as financial 
transactions or health services.134 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Open Information Enterprise Transactions: Business Intelligence and Wash and Spoof Transactions 
in Blockchain and Social Commerce (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246740; José Parra-Moyano, 
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Technology (March 14, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248913; Max Raskin & David  Yermack, 
Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking (2016). NBER 
Working Paper No. w22238, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2777326; Margaret Ryznar, The Future of 
Bitcoin Futures,   __ HOUSTON L. REV. (Forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3127327; Lawrence 
J. Trautman &n Oliver W. Aho), Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship, and Start-Up Finance, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=325138; Anne M. Tucker & Holly van den Toorn, Will Swing Pricing Save 
Sedentary Shareholders?, 2018(1) COLUM. BUS. L. REV. __ (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173736; Martin Walker,  Bridging the Gap between Investment Banking 
Architecture and Distributed Ledgers (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939281.  
133 See Amy Whitaker & Roman Kraeussl, Democratizing Art Markets: Fractional Ownership and 
the Securitization of Art (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100389.  
134 See Marcella Atzori, Blockchain Governance and the Role of Trust Service Providers: The 
TrustedChain® Network (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2972837; Alastair Berg, Chris  Berg & 
Mikayla Novak, Crypto Public Choice (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3236025; Balázs Bodó, 
João Quintais, Alexandra Giannopoulou & Valeria Ferrari, Barlaeus Dinner on Trust in 
Decentralized Data Infrastructures, Blockchain & Society Policy Research Lab Research Nodes 
2018/2, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3243360; Nick Cowen, Markets for Rules: The Promise and Peril 
of Blockchain Distributed Governance, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223728; Primavera De Filippi & 
Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory Technology: From Code is Law to Law is 
Code (December 5, 2016). Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a 
Regulatory Technology: From Code is Law to Law is Code. 21(12) First Monday, special issue on 
‘Reclaiming the Internet with distributed architectures (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3097430; 
Samer Hassan & Primavera De Filippi, The Expansion of Algorithmic Governance: From Code Is 
Law to Law Is Code, In Hassan, S. & De Filippi, P. (2017). The Expansion of Algorithmic 
Governance: From Code is Law to Law is Code. Field Actions Science Reports: The Journal of Field 
Actions. Special issue 17: Artificial Intelligence and Robotics in the City. Open Edition Journals, 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3117630; Ying-Ying Hsieh, Jean-Philippe Vergne & Sha Wang, The 
Internal and External Governance of Blockchain-Based Organizations: Evidence from 
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W.  Healthcare 
 
Healthcare in a number of various forms appears to be a category 
presenting substantial potential benefit from blockchain technology.135 However, 
rapid technological advances may bring serious new privacy concerns.136 
 
X.  Insurance 
 
The insurance industry has also been identified by scholars as a prime 
candidate for use of artificial intelligence and blockchain technology.137 
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Y.  Internet of Things (IoT) 
 
The literature suggests that the Internet of Things (IoT) may benefit from 
use of blockchain technology.138 
 
Z.  Law Enforcement 
 
Professor Karen Yeong describes the benefits of how automated 
enforcement via distributed ledger systems might work.139  
 
AA.  Legal Practice 
 
In addition to our discussion about smart contracts, the blockchain will 
likely impact the practice of law in numerous ways.140 
 
                                                                                                                                    
138 See Arushi Arora & Sumit Kumar Yadav, Block Chain Based Security Mechanism for Internet of 
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BB.  Marketing 
 
Professors Campbell Harvey, Christine Moorman, and Marcos Castillo 
Toledo present a compelling argument for the first movers in applying blockchain 
to marketing.141  
 
CC.  Privacy 
 
The intersection of blockchain technology and privacy issues has been 
addressed to date by several scholars.142 
 
DD.  Promotion of World Peace 
 
Professors Scott Shackelford & Steven Myers, “examine the rise of 
blockchains through the lens of the literature on polycentric governance to 
ascertain what lessons this research holds to build trust in distributed systems and 
ultimately promote cyber peace.”143 
 
EE.  Property Law and Real Estate 
 
Professor Katie Szilagyi discusses how blockchain has created novel and 
significant demands for changes in property law.144 Real estate practitioner Avi 
Spielman observes, “the inevitable convergence of blockchain and real estate may 
be viewed as a modern-day example of the classic confrontation staged when an 
immovable object meets an unstoppable force.”145 Potential applications of 
blockchain to real estate include, “improvements in database management, 
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information management, and efficiency ̶ such as multiple listing services (MLS) 
and smart contracts (leasing).”146  
An excellent You Tube video about “Emerging Real Estate Trends in 
Cryptocurrency and Blockchain,” is perhaps the most cogent explanation we’ve 
seen about the economics of blockchain mining.147 Based in Montreal, Canada, 
CBRE’s real estate professional David Cervantes, observes:  
 
Power Availability Dictates the Real Estate Footprint 
 
If we consider the global map of primary hubs for the mining 
process of crypto currency . . . the real driver is excess power or unused 
capacity at the generating source of power internationally. It is not 
enough to have cheap power, it must be cheap and abundant thus 
allowing for a marketplace to set-in.  
We monitor power costs across our many markets and find our 
clients gravitating to those regions that can offer power in the range of 
2.5 to 5.5 cents US per kWh. [2016 numbers] But increasingly, we are 
seeing a demand for greater price certainty with guaranteed power 
contracts exceeding 5-year terms.  
When seeking the link between the demand for mining capacity 
and the growth of the global mining footprint, all indicators point to the 
contracting of power. Crypto mining operations, the end-users of real 
estate in this industry, are required to strike power contracts with local 
utility companies. Where the power utilities are ready to commit to this 
sector by way of predictable power contracts, we see rampant growth.  
In China, for years, there had been no obstacles to growth for 
the large crypto mining firms. [During 2016], nearly 80% of the world’s 
crypto mining throughput was being processed in China. 
Utility companies, originally only a supplier of electricity to the 
sector have begun to partner with [blockchain] miners or have become 
themselves operators of crypto mines. This had led to coins acting as a 
unique store-of-value, not in the investment sense, but as a store of 
excess electrical capacity. Utility companies can tokenize their excess 
capacity when power is abundant and thus stabilize their profits when 
power is less so. . . . 
 
Power Cost 
 
To offer a window into the global marketplace for space and 
power, there is an emerging cost model and metric that allows market 
players to compare and compete internationally. The two variables are 
full-service power cost and facility cost. Now this is a departure from our 
traditional real estate inputs of dollars and square feet or square meters, 
but it begins belies the importance of power and cost to this sector as 
                                                                                                                                    
146 Id. 
147 See David Cervantes, “Emerging Real Estate Trends in Cryptocurrency and Blockchain,” CBRE 
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnjIV_Qcgzc (last viewed Feb. 24, 2019). 
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opposed to area. If we add the regional power cost to the facility cost and 
compare that figure to markets around the globe, we can quickly observe 
thresholds deemed appropriate by end users to pursue a deal. 
To provide an example from the wholesale colocation market: 
We earlier referenced desirable power costs at 2.5 to 5.5 cents 
per kWh US. [2016 numbers]148 
The market rate paid for wholesale hosted transactions is 7 to 
10 cents per kWh US. 
The margin remaining when we deduct the local power cost 
from the total wholesale cost represents the rent potential of the facility. 
. . . 
 
How Regulations Act as Both a Threat and a Stabilizing Force 
 
Power policy and government regulation has already played a 
significant role in this sector and will continue to impact the 
attractiveness of markets. Real estate is strongly linked to power policy 
in this sector just as it is in other high-power consuming industries like 
the production of steel. . . . 
As an example, the recorded demand from crypto currency 
miners targeting the Province of Quebec in the 5 months between 
October 2017 and February 2018 was 18,000 MWs. Hydro Quebec, the 
publicly operated utility company, called for government intervention. 
A moratorium was enacted, and new regulations were imposed in order 
to process and prioritize the demand. In order to manage the market, the 
government enacted both an economic development rate to be applied to 
firms that they deep qualified and a punitive and retroactive rate of 15 
cents per KWH for any firms found to be operating without a permit. 
These new rules sent many end-users scrambling to determine whether 
they would be awarded permits and dissuaded many others from entry.  
Regulation is a threat when a regional government can halt or 
hike prices of power. Any market which has opened its doors to new 
demand and who boasts alignment with government becomes a safer 
destination by comparison. A market which is post-regulation and/or has 
government alignment is even more attractive than those markets 
without any regulation at all.  
Site selection for crypto currency is gaining sophistication as 
operators are expanding their criteria beyond low-cost power to now also 
value predictable and reliable power. In the pursuit to stem risk in an 
inherently risky early phase of this business, regulation, if not too heavy 
handed, can provide a framework for productive deal making.  
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Direct Power at High Scale 
 
. . . A crypto mine may not have a tremendous amount in 
common with a tier 3 data center, but it may begin to closely resemble a 
quantum computing facility, or a rendering farm used to illustrate 3 
dimensional landscapes for films and video games. The growing need 
for compute capacity at ever-lower costs are leading end-users to explore 
and demand less resilient solutions. Sectors, include crypto currency, AI 
and others, need less of the high cost critical infrastructure such as 
generators and temperature control…The site selection for crypto 
currency will closely resemble that of large-scale quantum computing 
and virtual pools of 3 dimensional rendering, to name only these few.  
 
[Observations]… 
 
 1. Not all regions are created equal. The crypto currency and 
blockchain demand will gravitate to regions that have low power cost 
but also have abundant capacity for which power utilities are ready to 
contract.  
2. Power cost and facility cost are inversely proportional. 
Where the power cost is lowest, the margin for revenue potential of the 
facility is highest. If the regional power cost is too high, the revenue 
potential of a particular facility may be extinguished.  
3. Regulation is being applied in many different ways across all 
our markets. We advise our clients to be aware of prospective regulation 
and seek alignment with government power policies be part of a solution. 
. . .149 
 
FF.  Renewable Energies 
 
Several scholars have explored use of blockchain to facilitate growth in 
the energy industry toward renewable resources.150 
 
GG.  Satellite Navigation 
 
Blockchain is . . . slowly-changing, complex systems such as satellite 
orbits.  
Blockchain technology offers a unique solution to this problem by 
utilizing functions, processes, and information already incorporated into satellites 
while maintaining a maximum of forty-eight hours of data. The use of blockchain 
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150 See Adrienne Adjeleian, Oana Jurjica & Henry Kim, Breaking the Stagnant Spell: How 
Blockchain is Disrupting the Solar Energy Industry (2018),  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3207104; 
Lauren Downes & Chris Reed, Blockchain for Governance of Sustainability Transparency in the 
Global Energy Value Chain, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 283/2018 
(2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3236753.  
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provides a high level of trusted positional data that can be used to predict and avoid 
collisions which will save billions of dollars and valuable time.151 
 
HH.  Securities Clearing and Settlement 
 
Colleen Baker has recently written an excellent account of the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivative markets and clearinghouse structure and importance to 
global capital markets.152 Other scholars have illustrated the potential for 
blockchain based applications to provide efficiencies and security in the execution 
of clearinghouse functions.153 
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 II.  Smart Cities  
 
The blockchain has been recognized by scholars for its potential to 
transform urban living.154 
 
JJ.  Smart Contracts 
 
Although discussed previously,155 we list the category of smart contracts 
again here because of their profound significance to numerous specific uses.156 
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KK.  Space Applications 
 
Several scholars have written about the use of blockchain technology for 
extra-terrestrial applications.157 
 
LL.  State and Municipal Operating Efficiencies 
 
Brookings scholars Kevin C. Desouza, Chen Ye and Kiran Kabtta 
Somvanshi write, “Now U.S. state governments have recognized the [blochchain] 
technology’s potential for the delivery of public services and are at various stages 
of implementation. For blockchain to emerge as the technological imperative for 
public services, states will have to change existing regulations.”158 While the 
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activity of many state legislatures thus far has been limited to regulation to clarify 
existing money transmission laws to reflect cryptocurrency exchanges, Desouza et 
al., write, “that the vast majority of US states have taken at least some form of 
regulatory stance concerning cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology.”159 
Previously, Trautman has described the Delaware Blockchain Initiative, intended 
as, “a comprehensive program intended to spur adoption and development of 
blockchain and smart contract technologies in both public and private sectors.”160 
Desouza et al. write: 
 
[t]hen governor Jack Markell noted that “Smart contracts offer a 
powerful and innovative way to streamline cumbersome back-
office procedures, lower transactional costs for consumers and 
businesses, and manage and reduce risk,” and suggested that the 
state will “lead the way in promoting blockchain technology and 
its growing role in digital commerce.”161 
 
MM.  Tax Computation and Compliance 
 
A number of scholars have explained the use of blockchain technology to 
facilitate the computation, collection, or other issues surrounding the topic of 
tax.162 
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NN.  Timber Tracking 
 
At least one scholar has focused on the application of blockchain to track 
timber production.163 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The blockchain is a new and potentially disruptive technology. We have 
looked at a number of promising use cases. Our goal has been to provide a highly 
readable description of what blockchain entails; how it works; and what blockchain 
applications show promise beyond virtual currencies. We envision entrepreneurs 
coming together with those trained in computer science and cryptography to 
conduct interdisciplinary research and product development. The development of 
realistic blockchain-based systems is underway as the blockchain community 
gains traction. 
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